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OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Defendant Jace Edwards was convicted of attempted 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846, but was acquitted of 
an accompanying conspiracy charge under § 846.  Edwards 
argues that the Government violated his Fifth Amendment 
rights by repeatedly referring to Edwards’s post-arrest, post- 
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Miranda silence in the Government’s case-in-chief and 
during closing arguments.  We agree.  Because the error was 
not harmless, we will vacate Edwards’s conviction and 
remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
 In the early morning of October 23, 2011, law 
enforcement arrested Edwards while he was in possession of 
a suitcase containing several packages of apparent cocaine.  
Edwards had acquired the suitcase from a motel room 
occupied by Thomas Bruce.  Bruce had been arrested the 
previous day in Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson Airport after 
arriving from the Virgin Islands with several packages of 
cocaine stashed in his carry-on bag.  Upon his arrest, Bruce 
agreed to participate in a controlled delivery.  At law 
enforcement’s direction, Bruce informed co-conspirator 
Michael Samuels by phone that Bruce would be waiting in a 
nearby motel.  Samuels told Bruce to expect an individual by 
the name of “Mr. Dred.” 
 Soon thereafter, Edwards arrived at Bruce’s motel 
room.  Testifying at trial pursuant to a plea deal, Bruce 
claimed that Edwards identified himself as Dred.  Edwards 
stated that he was there for six kilograms of cocaine.  Bruce 
further testified that Edwards spoke with Samuels by phone 
upon Edwards’s arrival.  Bruce then showed Edwards six 
kilograms of apparent cocaine in Bruce’s suitcase.1  Edwards 
                                                 
1 Law enforcement replaced the actual cocaine in Bruce’s 
suitcase with an imitation substance before conducting the 
controlled delivery. 
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took the suitcase and exited the motel room, whereupon law 
enforcement arrested him.  
 Edwards, testifying in his own defense, presented a 
very different story of what happened in Bruce’s motel room.  
By Edwards’s account, he received two calls from an 
associate asking Edwards to move an individual from the 
motel to a different hotel.2  Upon arriving at Bruce’s room, 
Edwards told Bruce that “Dred” had sent him.  Edwards did 
not identify himself as Dred, but on cross examination, 
Edwards acknowledged that others had referred to him as 
Dred in the past.  Nevertheless, according to Edwards, he had 
exited the motel room with Bruce’s suitcase at Bruce’s 
direction without observing the suitcase’s contents and 
without any other knowledge of the drugs. 
 After issuing him a Miranda warning, law 
enforcement questioned Edwards.  Agents opened Bruce’s 
suitcase and showed Edwards its contents, but Edwards did 
not respond.  Instead, Edwards invoked his right to remain 
                                                 
2 Our review of Edwards’s testimony revealed that the 
District Court may have erroneously excluded Edwards’s 
descriptions of what he was told on these phone calls. The 
District Court considered these out-of-court statements to be 
inadmissible hearsay.  But a statement is hearsay only if it is 
offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(c)(2).  To the extent Edwards was offering the 
statements made to him to explain why he went to Bruce’s 
motel room—that is, for the statements’ effect on the 
listener—those statements were not offered for their truth.  
Therefore, they were admissible for a non-hearsay purpose. 
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silent.  At trial, the Government repeatedly sought to use 
Edwards’s silence after he was Mirandized as substantive 
proof of guilt as well as for impeachment purposes.  Over 
Edwards’s objection, the Government emphasized in its 
closing that Edwards had remained silent after law 
enforcement showed him the contents of the suitcase, 
suggesting a culpable state of mind.  The Government in its 
brief and at oral argument concedes that this was error under 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), but urges that the error 
was harmless.3 
II. 
 “Miranda warnings carry the Government’s ‘implicit 
assurance’ that an arrestee’s invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent will not later be used 
against him.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Davis, 561 F.3d 
159, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Therefore, it is a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment and due process “for a prosecutor to 
cause the jury to draw an impermissible inference of guilt 
from a defendant’s post-arrest silence” after a defendant is 
Mirandized.  Id. (quoting Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 
941, 947 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Shannon, 
766 F.3d 346, 354 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he rights secured by 
Doyle apply in equal effect ‘to federal prosecutions under the 
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 
350, 354 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979))).  But Doyle errors can be 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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harmless if the Government “prove[s] beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.”  Davis, 561 F.3d at 165 (quoting Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  This analysis requires 
an examination of “the totality of the circumstances” to 
determine whether Edwards’s guilty verdict “was surely 
unattributable to the error,” or instead whether there was a 
“reasonable possibility” that the error contributed to the jury’s 
decision.  Martinez, 620 F.3d at 337–38 (quoting Davis, 561 
F.3d at 165–66). 
 Here, the Government has failed to meet its burden.  
The Government’s references to Edwards’s silence were not 
made in passing.  Indeed, after first seeking to elicit testimony 
in its case-in-chief regarding Edwards’s post-Miranda 
silence, the Government in closing asked the jury directly to 
draw the very inference of guilt that Doyle and its progeny 
forbid.  Despite some evidence suggesting that Edwards’s 
exculpatory story was not plausible, the Government’s case 
depended in large part on Bruce’s recounting of what 
happened in his motel room.  Thus, the credibility of 
Edwards’s competing story was crucial to the outcome of the 
case.  That credibility was undermined by the Government’s 
insistence that if Edwards was truly unaware of the contents 
of Bruce’s suitcase, he would have waived his Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Under these circumstances, a new trial is 
required. 
 Nor did the District Court’s belated and ineffective 
curative instruction after the parties’ closings had been 
completed mitigate the effects of the Government’s conduct.  
The District Court instructed the jury that “[t]o the extent 
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there is an inclination of any defendant to not say something, 
you cannot hold that against the defendant for not saying 
something.”  SA-0393.  But this instruction came only after 
the District Court had overruled Edwards’s contemporaneous 
objection to the Government’s use of his post-Miranda 
silence during its closing statement.4  Thus, the District 
Court’s instructions were not the “proper and immediate 
action” necessary to avoid a Doyle violation in this case.  See 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764 n.5 (1987). 
 Further, the District Court had previously given 
contradictory instructions to the jury before closings that 
“what a person does, says or fails to say or do may indicate 
the state of mind in which the person did the act.”  SA-0343.  
And the District Court instructed the jury that it could 
“consider any statements made and acts done or omitted by 
the defendant” to determine whether Edwards acted with the 
requisite knowledge of the contents of Bruce’s suitcase.  SA-
0344.  In this case, “[i]t is rather easy to see” how the District 
Court’s instructions “might, in fact, have contributed to the 
jury’s verdict:  in the face of equivocal evidence of 
[Edwards’s] intent, the jurors were invited by the District 
Court to consider the statements that he failed to make.”  See 
United States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 439 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Considering the Government’s emphasis on Edwards’s post-
Miranda silence and “the manifest importance of immediate 
curative instructions whenever a defendant’s post-Miranda 
                                                 
4 Edwards did not renew his objection after the District Court 
sua sponte issued its curative instruction.  But the 
Government does not argue that we should review this case 
for plain error, so we apply harmless-error review. 
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warning silence is mentioned before the jury,” Martinez, 620 
F.3d at 339 n.15, we hold that the violation of Edwards’s 
Fifth Amendment rights was not harmless. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will vacate Edwards’s 
conviction and remand for a new trial.  We need not reach the 
remaining issues Edwards raises on appeal.5 
 
 
                                                 
5 In that regard, Edwards argues that the District Court 
erroneously admitted Bruce’s testimony as to statements 
Edwards made in Bruce’s motel room, and erroneously 
declined to grant Edwards minimal-participant status at 
sentencing.  We note, however, that a statement “offered 
against an opposing party” that “was made by the party in an 
individual or representative capacity” is not hearsay, 
regardless whether the statement was also “made by the 
party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), (E).  Further, if the 
District Court at sentencing is again faced with determining 
whether Edwards is entitled to a downward departure for a 
mitigating role, the District Court should consider the factors 
we outlined in United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 
(3d Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153 
(2d Cir. 1990)), in exercising its “broad discretion.”  United 
States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 238–39 (3d Cir. 1998). 
